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The first section of the Fair Housing Act' declares that "[i]t is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limita-
tions, for fair housing throughout the United States." 2 If the United
States has been officially committed to providing for fair housing for
the past 20 years, why is segregated housing still the prevailing
norm throughout our nation? Why does discrimination still regu-
larly occur when minority homeseekers venture into white areas?
Why are the opportunities for living in stable, integrated neighbor-
hoods only marginally better now than they were a generation ago
in the days of Lyndon Johnson, Everett McKinley Dirksen, and Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr.? In short, why has the Fair Housing Act accom-
plished so little?
This conference is an attempt to address these important ques-
tions. Earlier panels discussed the roles of federal, state, and local
governments in enforcing the Fair Housing Act. This panel will ex-
amine what private people and private organizations can do and why
their roles are so crucial. In many ways, private efforts under the
Act have been more successful than governmental enforcement. A
recounting of the impressive isolated achievements of private per-
sons and local fair housing organizations, however, must not lull us
into a sense of complacency. The fundamental question remains:
can a law that relies so heavily on private enforcement ever succeed
in systematically attacking the widespread patterns of discrimination
and segregation in America's housing?
L Methods of Enforcement
The Fair Housing Act is designed to rely primarily on private en-
forcement. The Act provides for three different methods of chal-
lenging discriminatory housing practices: (1) suits by the Attorney
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1. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982 & Supp.
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2. Id. at § 3601.
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General in "pattern or practice" and "general public importance"
cases under section 813; 3 (2) administrative complaints to the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) filed by ag-
grieved persons pursuant to section 810, which may lead to
proceedings in state or local "referral" agencies and, eventually, to
federal court suits by the complainants; 4 and (3) direct court actions
brought by private plaintiffs under section 812. 5 A fourth category
of litigation generated by the Act-private suits against HUD for vi-
olating its affirmative fair housing duties under section 8086-is not
explicitly authorized by the statute, but can be pursued under the
Administrative Procedure Act.7
The power of the federal government to challenge discriminatory
housing practices is limited. The Act authorizes the Attorney Gen-
eral to sue only when the defendant has engaged in a "pattern or
practice" of discrimination, or when a group of persons has been
discriminated against in a way that "raises an issue of general public
importance." 8 These phrases limit the justice Department to prose-
cuting cases that have "a measurable public impact."9 According to
the Supreme Court, the role of the Attorney General in enforcing
fair housing is "minimal."' 0 This characterization was made at a
time in the early 1970s when the justice Department had assigned
some two dozen lawyers to the task and was strongly committed to
enforcing the Fair Housing Act. During the Reagan Administration,
the Justice Department has all but abandoned civil litigation under
the Act. Last year, the Attorney General filed 17 suits under section
813, the most for any year in this administration, and the Justice
Department won two cases at the trial court level." These are na-
tionwide statistics. "Minimal" has become a generous word for the
role of section 813 suits in fair housing enforcement in the 1980s.
3. Id. at § 3613.
4. Id. at § 3610.
5. Id. at § 3612.
6. Id. at § 3608.
7. E.g., NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987). See generally Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law 212-
26 (1983); Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law 57-64 (Supp. 1986).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 3613.
9. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 217 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972); see generally Schwemm, supra note 7, at 281-86 (1983).
10. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
11. DOJ Civil Rights Division Sum up FY '87, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H)
9.6 (Mar. 1, 1988). The two trial victories were both in unusual cases: one challenged
the use of pro-integration quotas at Starrett City, a large apartment complex in a ra-
cially-mixed area of Brooklyn, New York, and the other involved a northern Michigan




By way of contrast, the number of section 810 complaints re-
ceived by HUD has grown in recent years. In 1979, over 2,800 ad-
ministrative complaints were filed.1 2 This figure has increased by
60% in the past eight years.13 HUD refers many of these complaints
to the 36 states and 72 localities whose fair housing laws are "sub-
stantially equivalent" to Title VIII14 and processes the rest. Under
section 810, HUD has 30 days to investigate a complaint, after which
it may attempt to resolve the dispute, but only by using "informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."' 5
This limitation is significant. It was inserted into section 810 as a
result of the famous "Dirksen Compromise."' 6 In the original ver-
sion of the bill proposed by Senator Mondale, HUD could issue
"cease and desist" and other affirmative orders. Senator Dirksen's
support, which was needed to pass the bill, was gained in exchange
for abandoning these powers and replacing them with merely "con-
ference, conciliation, and persuasion" powers. The Dirksen Com-
promise has resulted in an agency procedure that provides for
absolutely no sanctions against a recalcitrant defendant. In its first
review of this statute, the Supreme Court concluded that "HUD has
no power of enforcement."' 7
Nevertheless, thousands of persons aggrieved by discriminatory
housing practices bring their complaints to HUD every year. Their
reasons for using section 810 cannot be the option of ending up in a
state or local agency or, if all else fails, in federal court, because
these options are available directly, without the need for a prior sec-
tion 810 complaint. From a litigator's point of view, the advantages
of a section 810 proceeding are hard to fathom.' 8 However, most
people are not litigators. They may not know what their most effec-
tive legal options are. They may fear the expense and hassle of con-
sulting a lawyer and prosecuting a lawsuit. In comparison, filing a
12. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1979 Statistical Year-
book, at 43.
13. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1988, at 8.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c). For a list of those states and localities whose fair housing
laws have been determined by HUD to be substantially equivalent to Title VIII, see 52
Fed. Reg. 15304.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a).
16. The legislative maneuvering that led to the enactment of the Fair Housing Act is
described in Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 Wash-
burn LJ. 149 (1969).
17. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210.
18. "Given the advantages to the claimant of proceeding under § 812, it is hard to
imagine why anyone would voluntarily proceed under § 810 if both routes were equally
available." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 125 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
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complaint with HUD appears simple and easy. Whatever the rea-
son, the statistics on section 810 complaints present a sad irony-
the weakest of the Fair Housing Act's three enforcement methods is
the one most often used.
The third enforcement method authorized by the Act is a court
action under section 812. This provision is independent of section
810. A victim of discrimination may proceed directly to court with-
out first filing a HUD complaint or otherwise pursuing his adminis-
trative remedies.' 9 A section 812 suit may be brought in federal or
state court, and the court may award equitable relief, actual dam-
ages, punitive damages up to $1,000, and costs and attorney's fees if
the plaintiff is financially unable to assume them.20 The availability
of these remedies makes section 812 actions a much more effective
enforcement technique than section 810 proceedings.
Thus, by design, enforcement of the Fair Housing Act is primarily
dependent on private litigation. The Supreme Court has agreed,
concluding that "complaints by private persons are the primary
rriethod of obtaining compliance with the Act." 2' The experience of
the past 20 years has confirmed this view. The vast majority of re-
ported cases dealing with the Fair Housing Act have been brought
by private plaintiffs, not by the federal government. Indeed, all of
the Title VIII cases decided by the Supreme Court have involved
private plaintiffs. 22
This means that privately-initiated litigation has been responsible
for most of the major decisions concerning the meaning of the Fair
Housing Act. In general, these decisions have given a generous in-
terpretation to the statute, and private litigants deserve much of the
credit for creating this strong body of precedent. For example, pri-
vately-initiated cases have established (1) that the "otherwise make
unavailable" provision of section 3604(a) prohibits steering, 23 ex-
clusionary zoning,24 redlining,25 and a variety of other discrimina-
19. E.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 394, 394 n.3
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Royster v. Martin, 562 F. Supp. 623,
624 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Oliver v. Foster, 524 F. Supp. 927, 929 (S.D. Tex. 1981). See also
Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 104-06.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a), (c).
21. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
22. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 91;
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
23. E.g., Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 139-41
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019 (1986); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028,
1047 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd mere., 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977).
24. E.g., Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 145-50 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.




tory practices; 26 (2) that housing display advertisements featuring
only white models can violate the ban on discriminatory advertising
in section 3604(c);2 7 (3) that homeowners and real estate firms are
liable for the discriminatory acts of their agents and employees; 28
(4) that proof of discriminatory effect, as well as discriminatory pur-
pose, can violate the Act; 29 (5) that a defendant is liable if a prohib-
ited motivation was simply a contributing factor, and not the entire
reason, for his behavior;30 (6) that substantial damages for humilia-
tion and other intangible injuries can be inferred from the mere fact
of being discriminated against; 3' and (7) that broad remedial orders
may be appropriate inprivate actions as well as in "pattern or prac-
tice" suits brought by the Justice Department.3 2 In helping to estab-
lish these precedents, private litigants have acted "not only on their
own behalf but also as private attorneys general."33
II. Limitations of Private Enforcement
There are some serious drawbacks to the concept of relying on
private litigants for enforcement of the Fair Housing Act. Part of
the problem is that victims of housing discrimination often do not
lington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287-94 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025
(1978).
25. E.g., Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mtg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 893, 896 (N.D. Ohio
1977); Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 492-93 (S.D. Ohio
1976).
26. E.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984) (discrimina-
tory evictions); McDiarmid v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 604 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (insurance redlining).
27. Saunders v. General Services Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1057-59 (E.D. Va.
1987); but see Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 541, 543-47 (D.D.C. 1987).
28. E.g., Hobson v. George Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344, 352 (W.D. Tenn.
1982); Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 740-42 (6th Cir. 1974); Bradley v. John M. Brabham
Agency, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 27, 31-32 (D.S.C. 1978).
29. E.g., Betsey, 736 F.2d at 986-88; Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 146-48; Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d at 1287-90.
The Justice Department, which had been an effective advocate of the effect theory in
the 1970s (e.g., United States v. City of BlackJack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975)), has chosen to abandon this theory as a matter
of policy during the Reagan Administration. See Selig, The Justice Department and Ra-
cially Exclusionary Municipal Practices: Creative Ventures in Fair Housing Enforce-
ment, 17 U.C.D. L. Rev. 445, 474 n.128, 486 n.193 (1984).
30. E.g., Payne v. Bratcher, 582 F.2d 17, 18 (5th Cir. 1978); Moore v. Townsend, 525
F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1975).
31. E.g., Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219, 1220-21 (11 th Cir. 1983); Seaton v. Sky
Realty Company, Inc., 491 F.2d 634, 636-38 (7th Cir. 1974). See also sources cited infra
notes 34 & 37.
32. E.g., Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Boulevard Cooperative Owners, 599 F. Supp.
79, 81-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Davis v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 348-49 (N.D. Ind.
1984); Marable, 704 F.2d at 1221.
33. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211.
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even realize that they have been treated unfairly. A homeseeker
may have no reason to question the apartment manager who tells
him that no units are available or the realtor who shows him homes
only in neighborhoods where his own race predominates. In this
regard, housing is different from employment, for example, where
someone who has been fired or who has lost a promotion to a less
qualified applicant will have no difficulty recognizing that something
bad has happened to him.
Even if a victim of housing discrimination understands what has
happened, he may not want to sue. As noted above, the prospect of
hiring a lawyer and filing a lawsuit is not appealing to many people,
and this problem is especially acute in the housing field. The very
fact that an individual or a family is in the market for new housing
often means that their lives are in a state of flux that makes pausing
to file a federal lawsuit a practical impossibility. By contrast, a vic-
tim of employment discrimination usually is able to contemplate his
legal options in circumstances that are less disruptive.
The nature of litigation is also more difficult in the housing field.
Statistical evidence of the kind that may help prove an employment
discrimination claim is rarely significant in the typical housing case,
because housing suppliers are usually small, local entities that do
not control large numbers of units. The key to success in most hous-
ing cases is the proof supplied by "testers," who are sent to try to
deal with the defendant shortly after the plaintiff has been discrimi-
nated against. Persuasive tests require fast action, careful planning,
trained personnel, and organization-resources that a homeseeker
who has just been discriminated against may not have.
Even if a discriminatory practice can be proved, the rewards are
usually small. Unlike employment discrimination cases, the out-of-
pocket damages in most housing cases are de minimus. Awards for
humiliation and other intangible injuries are available, but have
rarely exceeded $20,000.34 Punitive damages under the Fair Hous-
ing Act are limited to $1,000,3 5 a provision that serves to protect the
most egregious violators from feeling the full force of an appropri-
34. See, e.g., Douglas v. Metro Rental Services, Inc., 827 F.2d 252, 256-57 (7th Cir.
1987) (reducing compensatory damage award for each plaintiff's mental and emotional
distress from $10,000 to $2,500); Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d
184, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1982) (reducing compensatory damage award for each plaintiff's
mental and emotional distress from $25,000 to $10,000); see generally Schwemm, Com-
pensatory Damages in Fair Housing Cases, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 83 (1981).




ate judgment. 36 Because housing markets are local by nature, de-
fendants are usually small or modest-sized firms that generally make
for less lucrative targets than the defendants sued in employment
cases. In the housing discrimination field, class actions are rare, and
large verdicts are virtually nonexistent. 37
The result is that relatively few fair housing cases are filed. The
total number of reported federal court decisions involving housing
discrimination is now about 400. Over a twenty-year period, that
works out to about twenty reported cases per year, or less than two
each month. The number of reported employment discrimination
decisions runs five to ten times that amount.
III. Two Sources of Encouragement for Private Litigation
The situation would be even worse but for two significant devel-
opments that have encouraged private fair housing litigation over
the past twenty years. The first is the growth of local, private fair
housing organizations that provide the necessary resources, particu-
larly counseling, testing, and legal services, to enable victims of
housing discrimination to assert their rights in court. These organi-
zations have become absolutely essential to the effective enforce-
ment of the Fair Housing Act.
One measure of the importance of these local organizations is the
uneven distribution of housing discrimination cases throughout the
country. Cities that have private fair housing organizations generate
a much higher incidence of reported cases. For example, Chicago
has produced a disproportionate number of important fair housing
decisions, because that city's Leadership Council for Metropolitan
Open Communities has provided free legal services to victims of
housing discrimination since Title VIII was enacted. The same is
36. Defendants whose Fair Housing Act violations also are covered by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1982) may be assessed punitive damages that are not
limited by Title VIII's $1,000 cap. E.g., Phillips, 685 F.2d at 191; Miller v. Apartments
and Homes of N.J., Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1981). However, some courts
have held that the $1,000 limit in Title VIII may be considered as a guide for an appro-
priate award even in these cases, thereby serving to dampen a full punitive award for
section 1982 claims as well. E.g., Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 491-95 (9th Cir.
1978).
37. There are some noteworthy exceptions to this general rule. E.g., Grayson v.
Rotundi & Sons Realty Co., (E.D.N.Y. 1984) Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H)
15,516 (Sept. 23, 1985) (upholding jury verdict of $65,000 in compensatory damages
and $500,000 in punitive damages for two plaintiffs); Phillips, 685 F.2d at 191 (out-of-
pocket damages of $2,675, emotional distress damages of $10,000 to each of two plain-
tiffs, and punitive damages of $100,000 against each of two defendants); Pollitt v.
Bramel, 669 F. Supp. 172, 176-77 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (compensatory damages of $25,000
and punitive damages of $25,000).
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true in Cleveland, Cincinnati, Richmond, and other cities that have
active fair housing organizations. In recent years, the Washington,
D.C., area has become a major source of fair housing cases primarily
because of the efforts of the Washington Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights under Law.
The other significant development is the Supreme Court's willing-
ness to define standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act as broadly
"as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." 38 In three of its
four Title VIII decisions, 39 the Court has addressed standing ques-
tions and, in all three, has made clear that proper plaintiffs under
the Act include not only direct victims of housing discrimination,
but virtually anyone who is injured in any way by conduct that vio-
lates the statute. These decisions have expanded the list of potential
"private attorneys general" under the Act to include: residents of
an apartment complex or community whose racial make-up has
been affected by the defendant's discrimination against outsiders;40
municipalities whose housing stock is being marketed by realtors in
a discriminatory way; 41 fair housing organizations whose mission is
being frustrated by the defendant's discrimination; 42 and housing
testers who are given false information because of their race. 43 The
significance of these decisions is that the private enforcement
scheme on which the Fair Housing Act relies is no longer solely de-
pendent on actual homeseekers who are the targets of discrimina-
tion. As explained above, these direct victims may not always be
able or willing to sue. The standing decisions mean that the burden
of enforcing the Act can be shared by indirect victims of discrimina-
tion, including private fair housing organizations whose knowledge
and resources allow them to be more effective adversaries of would-
be discriminators.
In its first Fair Housing Act case, the Supreme Court wrote that
the policy of the Act-to provide for fair housing throughout the
United States-was one "that Congress considered to be of the
highest priority." 44 The Court also noted the "enormity" of this
38. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (citations omitted); see also Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at
372.
39. See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 109; sources cited supra note 38.
40. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111-15; Trafficante, 409 U.S. 205. See also Havens Realty, 455
U.S. at 375-378.
41. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 109-11.
42. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 378-79.
43. 455 U.S. at 373-75.




task.45 Surely there can be no dispute about the latter point. The
nation's housing was heavily segregated in 1968, and racial discrimi-
nation was a widespread and accepted practice in the real estate in-
dustry. Housing was then and still is the last great frontier of civil
rights and the area most resistant to legal change. Against this back-
ground, the Congress of 1968 chose an enforcement scheme that
relies almost exclusively on private complainants. The Supreme
Court's standing decisions have correctly interpreted the Congres-
sional intent to be that a wide range of private complainants are
entitled. to sue under the Act. Congress could not have been so cyn-
ical as to put the burden of accomplishing this enormous task of the
highest national priority entirely on the shoulders of the individual
victims of discrimination.
The recognition that fair housing organizations and testers may
sue on their own behalf has led not only to more litigation, but also
to more effective non-litigation strategies and more voluntary com-
pliance with the Act. Housing suppliers simply behave differently if
they are operating in an area with an active fair housing organiza-
tion that is engaged in extensive testing and general compliance
monitoring. In addition, local organizations can make a vital contri-
bution to the public's understanding of and support for the concept
of fair housing; in the long run, this may be more important than
litigation in eradicating housing discrimination. As important as
these non-litigation strategies are, however, they generally require
at least the threat of effective litigation to back them up. Therefore,
the key to effective fair housing enforcement in a given area has usu-
ally been the existence of a vigorous private organization that can
support litigation. Some localities in the United States are blessed
with such organizations; others are not.
IV. Some Concluding Observations
Ultimately, in light of the limited changes in the nation's housing
patterns over the past 20 years, one has to ask whether the Fair
Housing Act can ever generate a systematic and effective attack on
housing discrimination in this country. Experience suggests that the
answer is "No." The strange enforcement scheme of the Act se-
verely limits the role of even a committed federal government. Indi-
vidual victims of discrimination are given some legal tools to
challenge isolated instances of discrimination, but the tools are
45. 409 U.S. at 211.
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blunted, the victims too often lack the will and resources to carry
out the fight, and individual litigation victories rarely can address
large-scale patterns and practices of discrimination. Local fair hous-
ing organizations can play a helpful role, but, aside from the legal
precedents their cases establish, their influence is generally limited
to particular geographic areas, leaving large parts of the country
with no effective enforcement program. The result is that wide-
spread housing discrimination continues, now victimizing a whole
new generation of homeseekers who were mere children when Title
VIII was enacted 20 years ago.
If the Congress made a promise in 1968 that the Fair Housing Act
cannot keep, then Congress must now remedy the situation. Cur-
rently, both the House and the Senate are considering amendments
to the Act that would strengthen its enforcement mechanisms by
providing for a more effective federal agency procedure, eliminating
the $1,000 cap on punitive damages, and implementing other
needed changes. 46 Passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act is
essential. Coupled with the Supreme Court's generous standing de-
cisions and a new administration likely to be more sympathetic to
civil rights values, a revitalized Fair Housing Act could go a long
way toward building an effective challenge to housing discrimina-
tion in this country. Then, and only then, will our people have a real
opportunity to decide whether they want to live in a truly integrated
society.
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